Due to cost considerations there must exist in intrusion detection system, a trade-off between the user's ease of access and capability of detecting attacks. The proposed framework applies two game theoretic models for economic deployment of intrusion detection agent. The first scheme models and analyzes the interaction behaviors between an attacker and intrusion detection agent within a non-cooperative game, and then the security risk value is derived from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The second scheme uses the security risk value to compute the Shapley value of intrusion detection agent while considering the various threat levels. Therefore, the efficient agent allocation creates a minimum set of deployment costs. The experimental results show that with the proposed two-stage game theoretic model, the network administrator can quantitatively evaluate the security risk of each IDS agent and easily select the most critical and effective IDS agent deployment to meet the various threat levels to the network.
enterprises and organizations have built security operation centers to control and analyze intrusion events. For example the Symantec ThreatCon warning system provides recommended protective measures, according to the threat level, that allows the system administrator to prevent, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to network attacks [22] . The several threat levels or conditions have a corresponding identification color, which indicates that mandatory protective measures have to be taken by the department administrators. However, these systems lack specific measures for rational decision-making, and do not use mathematical models to capture the interaction between attacker and defender. In this chapter, therefore, we propose a rating approach and an adjustable scale for preferences, which indicates the most suitable deployment of IDS given the threat level.
Recent intrusion detection systems can be divided into two classes: reactive preventing (e.g., signature or anomaly-based detection, ingress or egress filtering, etc.) and proactive mitigating (e.g., secure overlay services, proxy networks, etc.) [15] . Secure overlay services (SOS) architecture is for the prevention of network attacks and proactively mitigates distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, but secure agents require a large overhead for directing communication, and are limited in terms of its extending architecture [8] . Although SOS is more effective than reactive schemes, it still exists efficient in deployment problems. For example, how many overlay agents need to be deployed in the SOS architecture, and which agents are the best defenders for resisting attacks for the specific cost of IDS?
IDS architectures are prone to single points of failure that are vulnerable to discovery by attackers [8] . In order to solve this problem, as a back-up mechanism, it is necessary to designate many IDS agents so as to achieve the false tolerance in the secure overlay network. However, the more agents a security system deploys, the more vulnerability there is to discover and hence the price to pay is higher. Mass deployment and rich connectivity are not favorable for security. On the contrary, the fewer the agents deployed, the easier it is for attackers to penetrate, and the more difficult it is to respond. The robustness of a complete IDS decision process depends upon a balance between the agent requirements and failure tolerance. Therefore, there exists in IDS a trade-off between ease of user access and the capability of detecting IDS agents [1] . The administrator must develop a preference scale for improving agent deployment decisions and analysis so as to maintain equivalence between strategic decision-making and command-and-control in IDS management.
With the present optimization methods it is difficult to solve for IDS agent cost allocation problem (CAP) [23] . Hence, it is necessary to quantize the proposed framework for modeling attacks, to examine security risks (i.e., threats of attack), and to make decisions about actions in response. Here we use an economical solution for agent deployment. The game theoretic tools have been successfully applied in economics, political science, psychology, and decision theory. It also provides analytical techniques of use in many areas of research where multi-agents compete and interact with each other in a system [6] . In most multi-agent interaction, the overall outcomes depend on the choices made by all self-interested agents and make the choice that optimizes its outcome [18] . Therefore, we apply the game theoretic approaches to produce the framework for interaction between the network attacker and the IDS agent in relation to analysis and decisions related to deploying of the detection agent. It is a framework for deploying alarm multi-agent using game theory (DAMAG), which analyzes the detected threats and integrates with the existing IDS.
Interactions between the attacker and the IDS agent are modeled by game theory for identifying their behaviors in the intrusion detection systems. Additionally, the proposed DAMAG framework prioritizes to help the IDS agent make rational choices about severity of the condition, and to decide how many agents to deploy for the detection of significant threats in real time. Our study deploys an economical intrusion detection system which comprises two stages of game theoretic models for constructing two schemes. The first scheme models the interaction process between the network attacker and the IDS agent as a two-person and non-cooperative finite game. The proposed payoff functions utilize the security risk measures for two players (e.g., detection rate, false alarm rate, etc.). After this, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) is derived from these functions and assigned as a unique security risk value (SRV) for the agent. Then, the second scheme constructed a cooperative IDS agent game. The power index is the Shapley value [17] applied to calculate the marginal contribution between agent and mutually agreeable division of cost for IDS deployment. IDS agents are grouped into coalition groups by the various threat levels so as to provide fair and optimal IDS deployment.
A numerical example of the proposed framework is used to investigate the SRV agent and to verify that the Shapley value does indeed obtain the quantitative value for decision and analysis of the IDS. With four threat levels, the different agents' SRVs interact with each other and form coalitions for investigating the most significant agents in various situations. Since the different threat levels indicate the various strengths of attack, a fair and equitable Shapley value describes a stable strategy; the proposed framework can then be used to manipulate the scale to prioritize economical IDS agents. Given limitations due to cost, the administrator can easily deploy the optimal IDS agents for detecting attacks.
The existing IDS overlay network is described in the next section. In Section 3, we provide a framework which consists of a security risk game and a deployment agent game for distributed IDS overlay network. Section 4 presents numerical examples to evaluate the proposed framework and briefly discusses the observed experimental results. In Section 5, we survey related work using the game theoretic approach for network security. In Section 6, some conclusions and directions for future research are given.
IDS Overlay Network
The deployment of the critical IDS agent is supported by the information security operations center (SOC) which provides the central management and monitoring of a large-scale network. For example, in Fig. 1 , assume that the intruder would choose a path from the network to deliver a malicious packet from Host a (attacker) to Host t (target), and a distributed IDS provides specific nodes, N= {n 1 , n 2 ,. . ., n N }, where a node is defined as an autonomous software (agent) which resides at a host (e.g., router, switches, firewall, server, or station), and a host can hold only one IDS agent. The IDS agent utilizes specific techniques, such as signature comparison, pattern detection, and statistical analysis so as to report and prevent possible intrusions or anomalies occurring in a secure network. The IDS administrator arranges for certain detecting agents (nodes) to monitor and control the security of the entire common enterprise network. These detecting agents are mutually influenced by different security measures, such as the intrusion detection rate, false alarm rate, attacker bandwidth consumption, and so on.
The proposed game theoretic framework provides an optimal set of IDS agents to be deployed. The agent's SRV is utilized to create the security overlay network. The SRV of the agent is degree of the attack that is derived from previously defined security measures. In this study we deploy a mini-set of IDS detection agents in the IDS overlay network, which maximize the prevention of network attacks and minimize the number of current resource nodes; see Fig. 1 . We also hypothesize each IDS agent relative to the others for specific warning situations in the secure overlay network.
DAMAG
In this study two games are constructed, which represent the two stages needed for economical deployment of IDS. In the first step, we model interactions between network attackers and IDS agent behavior within a two-person, nonzero-sum, non-cooperative game. Moreover, we introduce security measures (i.e., intrusion detection rate, agent migration rate, false alarm rate, and attacker bandwidth consumption). Then the proposed security risk game generates NE as the unique SRV of an agent. In the first step the security risk game is applied and in the second step the deployment agent game is applied. In the first step, the average threshold of all agents is computed in order to confirm the threat level. In the second step, the SRV of each IDS agent obtained from the first step is utilized. In order to establish fair deployment, we construct an IDS agent for a cooperative game theoretic model. A simplified flow chart and algorithm describing the principles of optimal IDS deployment is given in Fig. 2 . The foremost goal of the second step is simplicity and scalability. Using the Shapley value as the power index we can create fair and efficient IDS deployment for a secure overlay network which consistently produces an optimal allocation of equitable detection node security values so as to help the system administrator make decisions. Finally, the last procedure increases or decreases the given scale for deploying the appropriate IDS agent in the secure overlay network within the various threat levels (i.e., thresholds).
The Security Risk Game
In general, the security risk may be defined in terms of the frequency with which breaches are expected to occur (or the security breach rate). Security breaches in an information system result when an attacker succeeds in violating a desired security property. It is measured as the expected cost of loss due to a potential security risk event [19, 20] and multiple security breaches.
Security risk = (security breach rate) × (average cost per breach) For any given threat, the IDS is only as strong as it is difficult for the attacker to succeed in the attack. Security strength metrics exist to quantify the detection rate, effort, and other resources required to bypass a system's safeguards against attack. In order to measure the strength of IDS security, we estimate the security breach rate (i.e., attacker's and agent's parameters) and the cost per breach. Thus, the aim of the first proposed model is to obtain the SRV of IDS agent that captures an attacker and the IDS agent behaviors within a two-person game theoretic model (as security strength metrics). Since security strength metrics survey attack threats from the perspective of the adversary, they complement security strength metrics which measure security from the perspective of those the IDS agents are intended to defend. In this chapter, we assume that the attacker and the IDS agent are rational players. Their security measures are defined as following:
Attacker. The population of users in the proposed framework of the network is monitored by the IDS. The user may become an attacker because of curiosity, to achieve self-respect or peer approval, the desire to intentionally destroy, etc. [21] . Thus, we present associated attacked measures. The attacker pays the cost, b 2 , which means he gains a profit if intrusion is undetected. However, if the intrusion is detected, the intruder (attacker) pays a punitive cost, b 1 . We also assume that (b 1 -b 2 ) ≤ 0; that is, an attacker who is detected gains a positive utility, while if (b 1 -b 2 ) ≥ 0 he pays a negative utility. We define scattered attacks as penetration past the IDS agent; they can propagate malicious codes rapidly and widely, such as was the case with DDoS and the code red worm [24] . In contrast, the pure attack is a single event, which does not propagate viruses or malicious codes. When the attacker starts the propagation attack on the i th agent and the sources of the DDoS or malicious code from the agent's host, its propagation rate is l i . Moreover, the ease of user access to the network tends to attract attacks. f i denotes the network bandwidth of access rate for the i th agent residing at the network host (to demonstrate the influence between attacker and agent). Alpcan and Basar [1] pointed out a based trade-off between security risk and ease of access network. The less a network host is protected by agent's detection mechanisms, the less difficult it becomes to access it, hence more convenient, and vice versa. So, if f i increases, the probability of attack increases. On the other hand, if f i decreases, the probability of attack decreases. The propagation attack presents λf i as multiple of pure attack f i .
IDS agent. The set of IDS agents is denoted as N= {n 1 , n 2 ,. . ., n N }. An agent resides at the IDS agent's host which refers to the network entity (e.g., router, switches, firewall, server, or station). The goal of the IDS agent, after investigation of the user's transaction, is to classify the user as a normal user or an attacker. Keromytis [8] proposed using an SOS architecture that requires the nodes to frequently randomize its location into the forwarding architecture, so as to prevent the attack. Thus m i denotes the migration rate (mobility) of agent n i at the host where the IDS agent moves to another host. The agent detection scheme commonly shows two types of errors: the classification of an attacker as a normal user (false negative or missing attack) and the classification of a normal user as an attacker (false positive or false alarm). A curve of receiver operating characteristics (ROC) is used for characterization. IDS configures to operate at a higher detection rate will result in a higher false alarm rate. The ROC curve of IDS also presents the trade-off between false alarm rate and detection rate [5] . Thus, for each agent's n i protective measures parameters there is an intrusion detection rate p d , false-negative rate (1p d ) and false alarm rate p f . The cost value -c 1 is the gain of the IDS agent for the detection of an attack while c 2 and c 3 are the costs paid by the IDS agent for false alarms and false-negative rate, respectively.
A normal (or strategic) form represents the attacker and the IDS agent's game, which includes the set of players: {Attacker, IDS agent}, and the sets of strategies:
The u 1 denotes the strategy of pure attack by the attacker with a probability of r 1 , the u 2 denotes the strategy of propagation attack with a probability of r 2 , and the u 3 denotes that the attacker does nothing and the probability is 1-r 1 -r 2 . The d 1 denotes the strategy of the IDS agent which consists of detecting the attack and the alarm response. The d 2 denotes the strategy of the IDS agent, to do nothing following the attack. In addition, let qand 1-q be the probability of detection d 1 and no detection d 2 , by the agent, respectively. Therefore, the security risk game is shown in Table 1 . The payoff of security risk game is expanded by adding a row and a column that represents a mixed strategy. The mixed strategy of the agent is called q-mix and that of the attacker is called r-mix [6] . Table 1 The security risk game
IDS Agent
Attack
Similar to the model of Alpcan and Basar [1] , our game has no pure strategy equilibrium, so the analysis is extended by considering mixed strategies with the player probability distribution in the space of their pure strategies [2] . The Nash equilibrium presents a steady state in a game in which the players' choices are not deterministic but are regulated by probabilistic rules [13] . The player has a mixed strategy NE; each player only considers the average payoff function of his coplayer, rather than optimizing his own average cost function [6] .
Every normal-form game has at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. In the next step the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, given by 3×2 bi-matrix, is computed. The strategy pair (r * , q * ) is said to constitute a non-cooperative mixed NE to the security risk game if the following equivalent inequalities are satisfied [2] :
where 0 ≤ r q ≤ 1. The Eq. 1 solves the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium pair (r * , q * ) which is the optimal for attacking and detection. The attacker has three strategies and must consider the three different actions in her mix. IDS agent also has two strategies. So, they consist of the three situations. We can use the prevent-exploitation method [6] that finds r * and q * from these strategies' intersections in the following three NE pairs.
A mixed NE pair (r * ,q * ) is an optimal strategy which presents the probability vector r * i ={r * (u 1 ), r * (u 2 ), r * (u 3 )} with actions {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 } of the attacker and the vector q * ={q * (d 1 ), q * (d 2 )} with actions {d 1 , d 2 } of the IDS agent. Let v i be the i th agent's SRV, which considers detection and attack probabilities. It can be computed by Equation (5).
where r * (u 1 ) and r * (u 2 ) indicate the attacker in optimal mixed strategy probabilities for pure and proliferated attacks, respectively. The q * (d 1 ) and q * (d 2 ) denote the optimal mixed strategy for the i th agent detection and no detection, respectively. A mixed strategy equilibrium predicts that the outcome of a game is stochastic, and it can capture stochastic regularity [13] . A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is similar to a stochastic state. The attacker and agent have information about their payoffs with which actions were taken in the past; each player applies these payoffs to form his belief about the future behavior of the other players, and hence formulate his optimal mixed strategy. Therefore, v i derived from two (the attacker and agent) optimal strategy probabilities for the ith agent presents the security risk value. The next proposed model uses SRV to compute the Shapley value of each agent within the cooperative game.
The Agent Deployment Game
In this section, we liken the interaction of IDS agent to the playing of a cooperative game in the IDS overlay network. A fair and efficient method is needed for deciding the number of and prioritizing the agents to be deployed for detection. The Shapley value is a power index for cost allocation [16] . The cooperative game provides a suitable model for the design and analysis of detection agent deployment, and it is shown that the famous Shapley value rule satisfies many nice fairness properties [23] . Thus, in the proposed model the Shapley value is applied to create optimal cost allocation for IDS deployment.
We define y: V → R + as a one-to-one function by assigning a positive real number to each element of v and y(0) = 0, V= {v 1 , v 2 ,. . .,v j }, j∈ n. The security of IDS deployment is based on the concept of the threat level, h. The security threat levels, H = {h 1 ,. . ., h H }, where 0 < k 1 <k 2 < . . . < k H are the corresponding threshold values. In Equation (6), given the agent's output vector v, the security level, L, of the IDS is equal to h j , if the sum of the SRVs of the agents is greater than or equal to k j :
where
The agents can be grouped into different security levels subject to the value of k j of the threshold. It is divided by H+1 threat levels from maximum SRV v Max to minimum v Mini . So this method divided the security levels averagely.
The SRV of the agent can be modeled as an N-person game with X = {1, 2,. . ., N}, which includes the set of players (i.e., agent) and each subset V ⊂ N, and where v j = 0 ∀ j ∈ V is called a coalition [6, 10] . The coalition of Xagent groups in the k th threshold of the threat level, and each subset of X(coalition), represents the observed threat pattern for different threat levels H. The aggregate value of the coalition is defined as the sum of the SRVs of the agent, y(C) = i∈ C y(v i ), and is called a coalition function. Each agent coincides with the given one or another of the kthresholds of the threat level. The different priorities for agent deployment can be derived from the various thresholds. According to intrusion threat for each IDS host with respect to others and the effect of the threshold values on various threat levels, Shapley value represents the relative importance of each agent. Let y(C) = i∈ C y(v i ), v i ∈V, C⊂X be the value of the coalition C with cardinality c. Then, the Shapley value of the i th element of the agent vector is defined by
In determining whether the SRV of the i th agent is greater than or equal to the value of the threshold of the h th threat level (i.e., coalition), the formula can be simplified to
Equation (8) can be simplified to Equation (9) because the term y(C)-y(C-{i}) will always have a value of 0 or 1, taking the value 1 whenever C is a winning coalition but not C -{i} [17] . Hence, Shapley value is S(i) where C denotes the winning coalitions with i∈ C y(v i ) ≥ k j . The Shapley value of the i th agent output indicates the relative SRV for the various thresholds (i.e., threat levels) so as to provide a computation for choosing a reasonable agent for IDS deployment.
In Fig. 3 , we input the set of agent SRVs to compute the vector of the Shapley value when considering the various thresholds k j . We assume the threat level to the IDS be a kind of security situation in which the network faces attacks. DAMAG computes the aggregation of the agent's SRV and presents the various agent coalitions in the overlay network according to the various threat levels. Let P h = {n h 1 , n h 2 , n h 3 , . . . , n h i }, ∀ i ∈ N, be the priority of the agent set, which is subject to the threat level h (e.g., green, yellow, orange, or red levels). Therefore, administrator decides which IDS agents are to resist the attacks based on the different security situations. This rating system is based entirely on the estimation of the utility's desirability for deployment of the IDS agent. The administrator can also utilize an adjustable scale to make decisions, which would select an optimal set of detection agents for resistance of attacks. 
Simulation Experiments
Numerical examples to verify the application of the proposed framework are presented in this section. First, 20 hypothetical number of parameters is given to model the bi-matrix, and randomly generate simulation sets of security measures for agents and attackers in Table 2 . Then, we apply the GAMBIT [14] to calculate 20 agents' We demonstrate 20 experimental agents in a secure IDS overlay network. The 20 SRVs are calculated exactly using Equations (2)-(4). Figure 4 (a) shows the sequence of 20 agent SRV vector outputs, V = [v 20 , v 19 (7) to obtain four thresholds k green = 10.08, k yellow = 20.15, k orange = 30.23, k red = 40.31 according to the SRV vector output. Using these threshold values we apply Equation (9) to calculate the exact Shapley value of IDS detection agents as shown in Fig. 4(b) . The threat level approach proposed (shown in Fig. 4(b) ) is a more objective and efficient deployment than pure SRV (shown in Fig. 4(a) ). It is interesting to note that the Shapley value of IDS agents with a low SRV is smaller for the red and orange threat levels than the ones for the yellow and green threat levels. This indicates that agents with low SRVs play a less significant role than others for switching to the red threat advisory. Figure 4 (b) also illustrates how the high SRV agents play a more significant role than do the lower ones in dangerous situations (e.g., red level) considering four threat levels. On the other hand, there is no particular difference between high and low SRV agents in gentle dangerous situations (e.g., green level). So, the proposed framework can also provide more quantitative values for various situations than in human decision-making, as is illustrated from a comparison of Fig. 4(a) with (b).
We also apply an adjustable preference scale so as to build a rating approach for the IDS deployment which provides a fair and equitable cost allocation. Administrator can adjust this preference scale to agent deployment of IDS within the four threat levels because of resource limitation. The fairness of the Shapley value for three experimental cases is examined by the proposed preference scale. Moreover, we respectively compare each agent's Shapley value (bigger than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01) within the four minimum sets, indicated in Fig. 5 (a-c) .
First, the preference scale of Shapley value is bigger than 0.01. Figure 5 (a) indicates that 12 agents P green = {n 15 , n 6 , n 5 , n 4 , n 14 , n 3 , n 2 , n 12 , n 17 , n 1 , n 11 , n 13 } are deployed in the IDS overlay network when the threat level is green. Eleven agents P yellow = P orange = { n 6 , n 5 , n 4 , n 14 , n 3 , n 2 , n 12 , n 17 , n 1 , n 11 , n 13 the IDS overlay network when the threat levels are yellow and orange. Nine agents P red = {n 4 , n 14 , n 3 , n 2 , n 12 , n 17 , n 1 , n 11 , n 13 } are deployed for the red threat level. Second, the preference scale of Shapley value is bigger than 0.05. Figure 5 (b) indicates that five agents P green = {n 12 , n 17 , n 1 , n 11 , n 13 } are deployed in the IDS overlay network when the threat level is green. Four agents P yellow = P orange = P red = {n 17 , n 1 , n 11 , n 13 } are deployed for the yellow, orange, and red threat levels.
Third, the preference scale of Shapley value is bigger than 0.1. Figure 5 (c) indicates that four agents P green = {n 17 , n 1 , n 11 , n 13 } are deployed in the IDS overlay network when the threat level is green, and two agents P yellow = P orange = P red = {n 11 , n 13 } are deployed for the yellow, orange, and red threat levels. Figure 5 (a-c) shows that different threat levels (advisories) efficiently provide specific selection of IDS agent to the administrator when the preference scale is adjusted. Figure 5 (c) shows that small numbers of higher SRV value agents are paid by specific resources so as to control few serious attacks suddenly and neglect to others if administrator changes the preference scale to serious situations (e.g., red level). In contrast, Fig. 5(a) shows that most of agents are averagely paid by specific resources so as to find out attacks gradually and prevent them from propagation if administrator changes the preference scale to gentle dangerous situations (e.g., green level). Figure 5 (a-c) shows that it provides the administrator with a way to prioritize IDS agents when detecting attacks for the different threat levels. Therefore, the proposed framework deploys the fair agent of IDS for threat advisory.
Related Works
Various game theoretic approaches have been applied to model the interactions between attackers and defenders for computer network intrusion detection. Burke [3] proposed a two-player game framework to model information warfare between two players, an attacker and a system administrator. In their model the mixed strategy equilibrium, which constructs a player's optimal solution, was used. The strategies and scenarios of the model are simple extensions with a few simulations to analyze how it would behave in real situations.
Lye and Wing presented a zero-sum, stochastic game model which included two players' moves and changes of state process [12] . Changes of state between attacker and protection are analyzed using Markov's decision process in order to compute the optimal solution for enhancing the security network and tracing the attacker. They are concerned that the more moves the two players make, the greater the lack of scalability and extension with the repeated game.
Liu et al. proposed a multi-stage game that could automatically infer the attacker and the system defense strategy [10] . They developed formalization of inference for the evaluation and analysis of the attacker's intention, objectives, and strategies, and compute the NE of the game to infer what would be optimal moves for the security system to counter the attackers. They also presented a multi-stage, signaling game for detecting attacks behaviors and for predicting the actions of attackers [11] . A credit card fraud scheme was modeled to show the eventual real effects of attacker actions.
Kodialam and Lakshman proposed using a zero-sum model to develop a network packet sampling strategy yielding the NE for improving the probability of detecting attacks [9] . While their model utilized more in-depth mathematical concepts than did the previous model, they still suffered from scalability and extension of the computed equilibrium solution.
Cavusoglu addresses the moves of the hacker and the system as an inspection game similar to arms control and disarmament or environmental control games [5] . They analyze the value of the IDSs using backward induction from the components of the model (i.e., user, firm, and technology). Their model has the drawback that the user has only two moves (i.e., to attack or not to attack) which does not meet the real situation of IDS in detection attacks. We study attacks that can propagate malicious codes rapidly and widely (e.g., DDoS, code red worm).
Alpcan and Basar proposed the utilization of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory concepts to address some of the basic network security trade-offs [1] . They constructed a sensor warning system and a security game for various decisions, analysis, and IDS control schemes. The sensor warning system generates a security risk value for the agent. This value could have various levels but the calculation is based on simple detection output. However, the strategy between the IDS and the attacker was incomplete so could not satisfy the decision-making requirements for IDS control. They proposed two independent schemes.
In all the above research, it is proposed that a game theoretic model be utilized for capturing the interaction between the attacker and the defender. Obviously, they meet common problems, related to extension and scalability. We propose a framework for connecting the security risk model and IDS agent deployment models.
Since an attacker has three moves and the IDS agent has two moves, these problems do not exist in our framework.
As far as we know, we have not yet found a framework for the fair allocation of limited cost for the deployment of the IDS agent. This is known as a cost allocation problem (CAP), and to decide whether a given allocation is fair is generally an NP-complete problem [7] . Recently, Shapley value division has been used in transmission system and wireless mobile ad hoc networks to allocate system costs [4, 15] . Comparisons of cooperative game solutions with traditional allocation systems verify they are better in economic and physical terms. The proposed Shapley value formula in this chapter is based on Owen's method [17] , which is described in detail in Section 3.2. We simplify the Shapley value formula to calculate the accurate value for large numbers according to the formation of a majority coalition of the agent in accordance with the threat level. The various threat levels are derived from the security risk value of each agent; the DAMAG framework also provides recommended protective measures for the security advisory system.
Conclusions and Future Work
We investigate existing schemes for resisting DDoS, including reactive prevention and proactive mitigation schemes. Recently, IDS administrators have been faced with a growing choice of security risks requiring a trade-off between ease of network use (ease of access) and the capability of system detection (detection overhead), in their discovery of IDS deployment problems. In this research, we apply game theoretic concepts to address this trade-off between security risk and ease of access for decision-making deployment of IDS overlay networks. The proposed framework is developed for IDS decision and analysis processing. It consists of two stages. The first game theoretic model is used to model the mixed strategy NE of the game to find the security risk value (SRV) of each agent, and the second model utilizes the SRV to compute the Shapley value for each IDS agent given the various threat levels. In order to build up a rating approach for deployment of IDS, we apply an adjustable Shapley value scale, which provides fair and equitable cost allocation. Additionally, we provide numerical examples demonstrating the suitability of game theoretic models to the development of IDS agents. The experiments actually identify and provide encouragement for the use of the framework to connect the Nash equilibrium and Shapley value concepts, enabling the IDS to prioritize deployment for four threat levels or situations. Future work will extend our proposed model and present a simulation using real data obtained from an organization's security operational center.
